Pakistan: The Other Rogue Nation by Ganguly, Sumit
In November 2003, shortly after Libya offered toopen its nuclear facilities to internationalinspection, it became public knowledge that
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father” of the Pakistani
bomb, had been deeply involved in peddling
nuclear weapons designs and technology to Libya,
Iran, and North Korea. Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf initially denied any Pakistani involve-
ment in these dealings. However, within days of his
initial denials he was forced to confront Khan’s
extensive role in this clandestine nuclear commerce.
In February 2004, President Musharraf induced the
scientist to publicly apologize for his actions, and
then proceeded to pardon him. 
As Pakistan’s investigation into Khan’s illegal
activities proceeds, Pakistani authorities, and their
American counterparts, have been at pains to sug-
gest that this vast subterranean nuclear network
was the product of individual malfeasance and lit-
tle else. Carefully orchestrated statements from
Islamabad have sought to create the impression that
mere greed drove Khan to pursue this deadly trade.
The US State Department, normally a vocal sup-
porter of export controls and nonproliferation poli-
cies, has mostly maintained a studious silence.
Administration spokespersons at the highest levels
have also done little to dispel the notion that the
Pakistani military was an innocent bystander as
Khan plied his trade with two key members of Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.” 
But all this leaves unanswered a central question:
are the proffered explanations credible? Could these
widespread nuclear transfers have taken place with-
out the knowledge and acquiescence of Pakistan’s
behemoth military establishment? Was money the
sole motivation for the diffusion of these weapons
technologies? Were these acts of proliferation
utterly unrelated to the Pakistani military’s relent-
less quest for nuclear weapons and ballistic mis-
siles? And why has the Bush administration been
so willing to accept this anodyne explanation about
these insidious nuclear transfers?
A TORTURED NUCLEAR HISTORY
The explanations Islamabad has trotted out, and
to which Washington has provided a formal nod,
strain credulity. The vast network of nuclear trans-
fers did not result from a single individual’s greed
and malfeasance. The diffusion of nuclear technol-
ogy that emanated from Pakistan was inextricably
intertwined with the warp and woof of the country’s
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. To
unravel this complex relationship it is necessary to
briefly explore the tangled history of Pakistan’s
quest for nuclear arms. 
The Pakistani nuclear weapons program began
in 1972 when, following Pakistan’s overwhelming
military defeat at India’s hands the year before,
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated the
program as a strategic counter to India’s substan-
tial conventional military superiority. After
Bhutto’s incarceration, and subsequent death, at
the hands of a military dictatorship headed by
General Zia ul-Haq, control of the nuclear
weapons program shifted strictly to the military
establishment. Even with the restoration of civil-
ian rule the military refused to part control over
the nuclear estate. For example, under Prime Min-
ister Benazir Bhutto (who succeeded General Zia
when Pakistan returned to civilian rule in 1988),
the military so zealously guarded its nuclear
secrets that Bhutto only learned the extent of Pak-
istan’s progress with nuclear weapons on a state
visit to the United States.
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“There is little question that ultimate responsibility for the dispersal of nuclear 
technology from Pakistan rests squarely with the Pakistani military.”
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Earlier, under General Zia’s regime, Pakistan had
made yeoman progress on its nuclear weapons pro-
gram through a dexterous policy of deceit, dissem-
bling, and outright theft. In 1975, Khan, then an
unknown Pakistani metallurgist, decamped from
the Netherlands with blueprints for centrifuges
from the Dutch component of the European ura-
nium-enrichment consortium URENCO, where he
had been employed. Once he surfaced in Pakistan
he was embraced as a national hero. Over the next
several decades he played an integral role in the
enriching of uranium to weapons-grade levels at his
sprawling nuclear complex at Kahuta.
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration did
little to stop Pakistan’s attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons capabilities. Earlier, during the Carter
administration, Pakistan had been the subject of
much American opprobrium because of the exe-
crable human rights
record of the Zia-ul-Haq
military regime and its
determined pursuit of
nuclear weapons. With
the 1978 Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the
Zia regime’s fortunes
changed dramatically. Because of Pakistan’s signifi-
cant role in the prosecution of the war against the
Soviet occupation, US officials during the 1980s
looked the other way while Islamabad accelerated its
quest for nuclear weapons.
The reliance on Pakistan to aid the Afghan
mujahideen not only led the United States to all but
suspend its Pakistani nonproliferation efforts, but
also saw it provide Pakistan with substantial
amounts of advanced weaponry. Proponents of this
policy argued that the provision of such weaponry
to Pakistan’s military would assuage the country’s
security anxieties and thereby curb its quest for
nuclear weapons. Instead, the Pakistani military
cynically pursued its nuclear weapons program
while extracting as much security assistance from
the United States as possible. 
American policymakers proved equally craven
when Pakistan’s strategic utility ended. After the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the US
State Department promptly failed to certify that
Pakistan did “not possess a nuclear explosive
device.” As a result, under the terms of the Pressler
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, the
United States was compelled to impose sanctions.
The substantial arms assistance to Pakistan drew to
an abrupt halt. The Pakistani civilian government
of Prime Minister Bhutto bitterly protested this
about-face in US policy but to no avail; the sanctions
on Pakistan remained in place. Sanctions, however,
did little to retard the progress of the Pakistani
nuclear weapons program. 
THE CHINA SYNDROME
With the United States abjuring engagement with
Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China became all
the more important. China has been a longtime and,
most important, unwaveringly reliable ally of Pak-
istan over the past four decades. In its search for the
appropriate delivery vehicles for its nuclear weapons,
the Pakistani military turned to this all-weather
friend. Although notionally committed to the US-
sponsored program to limit ballistic missile prolifer-
ation known as the Missile Technology Control
Regime, China proved both able and willing to trans-
fer the requisite ballis-
tic missile technology
to Pakistan. Earlier it
had provided Pakistan
with substantial assis-
tance on the design of a
nuclear weapon. China’s
willingness to supply
these technologies, most notably the M-11 missile,
with a flight range of 451 miles, had one compelling
motivation: to build Pakistan up as a strategic surro-
gate against India in South Asia. 
When China’s blatant transfer of ballistic missile
technologies to Pakistan piqued the American non-
proliferation community in the early 1990s, the
United States reluctantly imposed limited sanctions
on both China and Pakistan. The sanctions on China
were restricted to the particular “entities” that were
involved in proliferation activities. They also proved
to be of limited duration. Despite the sanctions, Chi-
nese officials publicly denied that any transfers had
taken place. Privately, they assured the United States
that they would end their assistance to Pakistan. 
These assurances notwithstanding, the technol-
ogy transfers did not end. Thanks to Chinese assis-
tance during the closing decade of the century,
Pakistan managed to develop a modest but viable
nuclear weapons program replete with a range of
short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
some sent directly from China’s client, North Korea.
The military establishment, working in concert with
Khan and his associates, had managed to under-
mine, subvert, and circumvent the emerging global
nonproliferation regime. In May 1998, within two
weeks after India carried out nuclear tests, Pakistan
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Despite the threats to his regime from radical
Islamists, the vast majority of the Pakistani
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also crossed the nuclear Rubicon with its own tests.
Although further and costly American sanctions
soon followed, Pakistan’s politico-military leadership
refused to contain its nuclear weapons program. 
In the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests in 1998, China reassessed its arms
transfers policies to the region. At one level, China
wanted to seize the moral high ground in an
attempt to upbraid its upstart neighbor—India—
for testing nuclear weapons. To pursue this goal,
however, it needed to assure the United States that
it was no longer a rogue proliferator of ballistic mis-
sile technologies.
As the Chinese connection diminished, the Pak-
istani military and nuclear establishments were
forced to turn to another source, namely North
Korea. Isolated in the global order and seeking to
fabricate its own nuclear weapons, North Korea was
able to offer Pakistan the technologies that the latter
so badly wanted. The interests of these two desper-
ate states neatly dovetailed. Pakistan could provide
centrifuge technology in exchange for access to
North Korean ballistic missile technology. This
alliance of convenience blossomed and expanded
into the new century.
AMERICA’S DEAFENING SILENCE
Ironically, at the cold war’s end the United States
expended considerable time, attention, and money
to try to prevent unemployed nuclear scientists from
the former Soviet Union from offering their deadly
wares and their skills to the highest bidder. Much of
this effort was accomplished under the aegis of the
Nunn-Lugar program, named after the erstwhile
senior Democratic senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn,
and the current chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Republican Richard Lugar from Indi-
ana. Yet, while the United States was fixated on
nuclear seepage from the former Soviet Union, the
tentacles of a hydra-headed monster were spreading
out in numerous directions from the self-described
“most allied ally” of the United States, Pakistan. 
There is little question that ultimate responsibility
for the dispersal of nuclear technology from Pak-
istan rests squarely with the Pakistani military,
which continues to be the sole guardian of the coun-
try’s nuclear weapons program. Critical choices
made by America, however, must also be adduced
to explain the failure to stop the growth, expansion,
and success of this nuclear network. As was noted,
the United States did little to curb Pakistan’s fervid
efforts to obtain nuclear weapons during the Zia
years. In addition, as the University of Chicago’s
Alyssa Ayres has argued, the Pakistani army under
General Zia’s tutelage extended its sway into a range
of areas normally within the sphere of the civilian
administration. This creeping militarization of the
Pakistani state and society did not elicit even the
mildest of rebukes from the United States.
As long as the Pakistani military allowed Amer-
ica to use Pakistan as a staging ground for the pros-
ecution of the war against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan, the United States was prepared to
countenance General Zia’s insidious transformation
of Pakistan’s domestic political arrangements. When
Pakistan’s strategic significance ended in 1990, Pres-
ident George H. W. Bush’s administration disengaged
from Pakistan and imposed a raft of sanctions.
The administration did little or nothing, however,
to bolster Pakistan’s fledgling democracy through
targeted economic assistance. As a result, despite the
notional return to democratic rule following Gen-
eral Zia’s death in an airplane crash in 1988, the
Pakistani military managed to zealously guard its
institutional and political prerogatives. The exis-
tence of an executive president who could dismiss
prime ministers at will, usually on the advice of the
army chief, gave the military wide extra-constitu-
tional powers. More to the point, the military con-
tinued to consume at least a third of the national
budget and maintained firm control over the
nuclear weapons program. 
US policy toward Pakistan did not undergo a fun-
damental change until the waning days of the Clin-
ton presidency. The Clinton administration had
many grievances against Musharraf, who had come
to power following the overthrow of the incompe-
tent, corrupt, and unstable government of Nawaz
Sharif. The US was distressed at his coup, his role in
the 1999 war against India—General Musharraf is
widely referred to as its “architect”—his unwilling-
ness to contain the nuclear weapons program, and
his continued support for the scrofulous Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. Indeed, Bill Clinton point-
edly snubbed Musharraf with a five-hour stopover
in Pakistan after he had spent over five days in
India on his sole presidential visit to South Asia. 
The Bush administration might well have con-
tinued the Clinton policies of isolating Pakistan
were it not for the events of September 11, 2001.
Again Pakistan’s strategic geography proved a desir-
able asset for the United States. Amazingly, the new
Bush administration promptly absolved General
Musharraf of his many misdeeds in its quest to
eviscerate Al Qaeda and demolish the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. The plethora of sanctions
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that had been imposed was swiftly lifted, and mil-
itary and economic assistance once again poured
into Pakistan. As in the past, the administration
made few demands on General Musharraf ’s mili-
tary regime for reform. A deeply flawed election in
2002 that helped bring a number of Islamic reli-
gious parties to power elicited virtually no adverse
comment from the US State Department. With
America’s seeming imprimatur, the Musharraf
regime was able to pursue its deadly nuclear com-
merce with impunity. Even the American discov-
ery in July 2002 of a Pakistani air force C-130
flying to and from Pyongyang brought only a mild
criticism from the State Department.
The deafening silence from the State and Defense
Departments on the most recent revelations regard-
ing Pakistan’s continuing involvement in this deadly
commerce is characteristic of American policy
toward Pakistan and other allies of convenience.
Despite substantial circumstantial evidence that
links the Musharraf regime to some of these tech-
nology and weapons transfers, the Bush adminis-
tration has shown little or no willingness to upbraid
the general. Instead, it appears content to have
Khan serve as a convenient scapegoat for the gen-
uine malfeasances of the Pakistani military.
CLOSING THE NUCLEAR BAZAAR
If the United States hopes to end this clandestine
nuclear trade, it will have to adopt a new set of poli-
cies toward the Pakistani military regime. Without
a significant policy shift the United States will sim-
ply fail to shut down the nuclear bazaar.
American policy makers must realize that Gen-
eral Musharraf needs the United States as badly, if
not worse, than the United States needs him. Just
before 9-11, Pakistan was teetering on the brink of
a large-scale financial default to multilateral lend-
ing institutions. The American economic largesse
lavished on the regime in the aftermath of 9-11
(about $3 billion over five years) enabled it to stave
off financial disaster. Today US economic assistance
provides critical life support to the nearly moribund
Pakistani economy. Consequently, the United States
should be in a position to drastically shape the Pak-
istani military’s long-term choices.
It is also important to demolish a popular con-
tention that significant US pressure on the Pakistani
military establishment to reorder its priorities would
lead to its imminent collapse and the emergence of a
radical, viscerally anti-American Islamist regime.
Instead, it is the seemingly uncritical American cod-
dling of yet another squalid dictator that is generat-
ing much popular anti-Americanism within Pakistan.
General Musharraf and his acolytes and their ardent
supporters in the United States have propagated a
base canard that he and his regime are indispensable
to the pursuit of US interests in the region. Ironically,
it was Musharraf ’s cultivation of the Islamist politi-
cal parties and his untrammeled hostility toward the
two established political parties, the Pakistan Mus-
lim League and the Pakistan People’s Party, that con-
tributed to the current political ascendance of Islamic
forces in Pakistan. Despite the threats to his regime
from radical Islamists, the vast majority of the Pak-
istani army remains firmly in Musharraf’s corner. 
Given the existence of significant American
leverage over Pakistan and the low probability of an
Islamist takeover, it is in the interest of the United
States to prod the Pakistani military to return to its
barracks. Without this pressure Pakistan will not
see a restoration of viable civilian institutions and
the military will inevitably return to its trade in
nuclear wares in the global bazaar. Only the grad-
ual but firm restoration of robust civilian and demo-
cratic institutions within Pakistan can repair the
rule of law within that hapless country. With the
military taking on a bloated, extra-constitutional
role, any notion of accountability over clandestine
operations—whether involving support to Islamic
zealots or the dubious transfers of nuclear technol-
ogy—will not prevail. In the absence of any domes-
tic mechanism of such accountability, scrutiny, or
control, the military, which has long benefited from
these questionable endeavors, will have little or no
incentive to alter its time-honored practices.
Shifting political authority to legitimate, demo-
cratic institutions will require a serious, long-term
American engagement with Pakistan. Any strategy
that falls short of this commitment will merely
amount to a palliative and fail to redress the insti-
tutional pathology that ails Pakistan. Most impor-
tant, failure could also contribute to reconstitution
of the global nuclear bazaar. A democratically
elected government could, over time, embark upon
the difficult but necessary process of establishing
much-needed civilian oversight over Pakistan’s
nuclear program. ■
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